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Abstract 
One particularly significant piece of labour legislation in India is the Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (CLA,1970), which regulates labour hired by firms 
through the offices of a labour contractor - such labour being referred to as ‘contract’ labour 
in India. This paper seeks to examine this Act and its implication for manufacturing 
employment in India. While empirical evidence seems to indicate the presence of large 
number of ‘contract’ workers in the Indian manufacturing sector across a spectrum of 
industries, this increasing contractualisation of the workforce has not been typically discussed 
as a pointed labour regulation issue. It has been widely argued that Indian labour law imposes 
institutional rigidities inhibiting employment expansion; but note needs to be taken of a 
ruling by the Supreme Court in 2001 which interpreted the CLA, 1970 in the case of Steel 
Authority of India v. National Union Water-Front Workers. This judicial interpretation has 
led to increased flexibility in the Indian labour market enabling firms to employ ‘contract’ 
workers widely, often employing them in jobs where they work alongside permanent 
workers. Against this backdrop, we undertake a preliminary empirical exercise in an attempt 
to document the increase in engagement of ‘contract’ workers and to dissect the data to see 
patterns in the use of ‘contract’ workers in formal manufacturing. These empirical patterns 
help us generate hypotheses for further work on the normative consequences of large scale 
use of ‘contract’ labour – the use of ‘contract’ workers no doubt brings in flexibility in labour 
usage and can be judged as a beneficial development for employers, however issues of 
investment in skills remains a hindrance in enhancing labour as well as overall welfare.   
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Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 and Labour Market Flexibility: 
An Exploratory Assessment of Contract Labour use in India’s Formal Manufacturing 
Deb Kusum Das* , Homagni Choudhury+ and Jaivir Singh^ 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Despite widespread reforms including trade policy reforms and industrial de-licensing, 
particularly aimed at making the manufacturing sector in India more efficient in terms of 
productivity, output and job creation, the sector failed to take off like that in China and other 
East Asian economies. The share of manufacturing in aggregate GDP remained more or less 
constant over the last two decades at about 16 per cent while the economy’s overall growth 
over the period has been relatively strong with average growth of about 7 per cent per annum. 
While this pattern reflects a complex array of phenomena, a key issue that often emerges in 
policy discussions is the lack of labour market reforms (see, for example, Besley and 
Burgess, 2004; Gordon and Gupta, 2004; Kochhar et al, 2006; Panagariya, 2006; Gupta et al, 
2009, among others). There are concerns among policy makers and academics alike that the 
collective institutions of restrictive labour legislations, trade unions and wage setting in India 
have created rigidities and inflexibilities in the labour market, which in turn has hampered 
output, investment and employment expansion, particularly in the formal manufacturing 
sector. 
Little systematic empirical work has examined the effects of collective institutions in the 
labour market on manufacturing performance. The focus of most studies has been to examine 
the effects of trade liberalisation and industrial deregulation on manufacturing performance in 
India and majority of these studies suggest that the unimpressive performance of the 
manufacturing sector in the post-reforms period may be reversed by carrying out 
complementary reforms including labour market reforms. The little empirical evidence 
available on labour market rigidities in India is quite mixed and inconclusive. The empirical 
studies examining effects of restrictive labour market institutions on labour market outcomes 
and manufacturing performance have focused almost exclusively on the Industrial Disputes 
Act (IDA), 1947 despite the existence of several labour laws. Exploiting central and state 
level amendments to the IDA over time, the unanimous verdict that these studies draw is that 
pro-worker amendments to labour legislation have caused rigidities and inflexibilities in the 
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labour market thus impairing industrial performance thus emphasising the need for de jure 
labour market reforms. However, contrasting evidence on flexibility of labour markets also 
exists which emphasise that de facto reforms in the last two decades have resulted in the 
formal private sector sometimes being successful in evading the legal requirements of 
protective labour legislations and restructuring their technological and managerial practices 
(Mathur, 1991; Shyam Sundar, 2005; Anant et al, 2006; Sharma, 2006, among others). Given 
this mixed empirical evidence, it is imperative to carry out a systematic study, which aims to 
understand how flexible is the Indian labour market? At the end of the day, whether India’s 
collective institutions of protective labour legislation, trade unions, and wage setting system 
have created significant rigidities and inflexibilities in labour markets is an empirical issue, 
but we first need to assess if there is any labour market flexibility at all contrary to popular 
perception - this is one of the key aims of this paper.  
In the backdrop of the above discussion, it is important to point out that there is emerging 
evidence that employers in formal manufacturing in India circumvent the problems posed by 
the restrictive institutions (particularly, the IDA) by employing contract workers who are 
outside the purview of the major labour laws (Kapoor, 2014, Chaurey, 2015). Instead, 
contract workers and their employment are regulated by the provisions of the Contract 
Labour Act (CLA) 1970. The Act, which was originally intended to protect the interests and 
welfare of contract workers, is now used by employers to circumvent other restrictive labour 
laws. The CLA and particularly recent judicial interpretations of the Act in the 2000s in 
favour of principal employers has actually led to de facto reforms making the labour market 
more flexible contrary to popular perception. However, to our knowledge, there has been no 
systematic attempt to assess the effects of the CLA on manufacturing performance. The 
literature has been more obsessed in examining the effects of the Industrial Disputes Act 
(IDA), 1947 on manufacturing performance. Our view is that the strict hire and fire 
provisions under the IDA are increasingly circumvented by the use of contract workers and 
hence it becomes significant to explore the implications of the CLA. In this paper, we 
therefore undertake an exploratory analysis of the implications of the CLA on labour market 
flexibility by empirically investigating the effect of recent pro-employer judicial 
interpretations of the legislative provisions of the CLA on use and engagement of contract 
workers in formal manufacturing. This allows us to identify key research questions and 
hypotheses from the patterns of contract worker use that we discern at both aggregated and 
dis-aggregated levels by industry and across states over the time period 2000-01 to 2011-12 
in this paper, which we intend to follow up and investigate in our future work. As such, the 
aims of the current paper are twofold. First the paper aims to bring out the fact that the 
judiciary has progressively interpreted the CLA with a pro-employer orientation. Second the 
paper aims to assess empirically whether there is any evidence of increase labour market 
flexibility and contractualisation of the workforce following the judicial interpretations of the 
CLA.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present an overview of the 
collective institutions governing the labour market in formal manufacturing in India, which 
are widely argued to be restrictive, resulting in rigidities and inflexibilities in the labour 
3 
 
market. Section 3 then assesses the CLA and argues that judicial interpretations of the law 
have enabled employers to circumvent the problems caused by the restrictive labour laws. 
Section 4 empirically assesses the trends in the use of contract labour in the last decade 
highlighting how regular workers have been substituted with contract workers over the past 
decade and the economic issues such a trend poses to the manufacturing sector. Section 5 
summarises and draws some conclusions on the way forward for labour market reforms in 
India.  
2. Labour regulations in India and the current debate on labour market reforms 
In this section, we outline the content and complexity of existing labour regulations in India 
and note that the literature has often pointed towards the perverse effects that this regime has 
had on manufacturing performance – leading us to the ongoing debate on the need for labour 
market reforms in India. This section therefore spells out the background to the issues 
addressed in this paper, setting the context for the analysis in the following sections. We first 
present the nature and scope of the existing labour legislations in India followed by a 
discussion of the collective institutions that govern the labour market. We then outline the 
rigidities that such protective labour institutions produce, invoking some of the analytical 
arguments made in the literature as well as the discussion surrounding the empirical evidence 
on these apparent rigidities. We then conclude this section with where we stand and what is 
the way forward. 
2.1 Nature and scope of labour laws 
Labour laws in India essentially cover only those workers who work in the formal sector. 
While, on paper, there are many laws regulating conditions of work in the informal (which 
includes the agriculture sector) sector also, in practice, it is difficult to administer and enforce 
them due to the decentralised nature and geographic dispersion of the activities in the 
informal sector. Further, even where there is scope for laws to come into play, enforcement is 
problematic and difficult given that employment contracts are informal in nature and 
workers, who work in this sector, are largely illiterate and are unaware of their rights. As 
such, the informal sector along with the agricultural sector, which account for the bulk of 
employment in the country, has by and large remained outside the scope of laws and 
institutions that regulate the labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector, which 
enjoys the labour laws and is under the purview of the labour market institutions, employs 
only a small proportion of the workforce in the economy. The formal sector broadly consists 
of the public sector, the private corporate sector, agriculture plantation, the factory sector 
spanning manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and repair services, and includes all 
workers in regular wage employment in establishments registered under the Factories Act, 
1948, which relates to units which employ 10 or more workers with the aid of power and 
units which employ 20 or more workers without the aid of power.  (Nagaraj, 2002) The 
formal sector constitutes less than a tenth of the economy’s workforce: in 1977-78 it 
employed 8.7 per cent of the total workers in the economy, which marginally rose to 8.8 per 
cent in 1987-88 and then marginally fell to 8.1 per cent in 1993-94 (Ghose, 1999), which 
further fell to 7.02 per cent in in 1999-00 (Mitra, 2008).  
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Turning to legislative authority over labour issues in India, both the Central government as 
well as the individual state governments exercise legislative powers so that the latter have the 
power to amend central legislations or to introduce subsidiary legislations. In fact the state 
governments are responsible for the enforcement of most of the labour regulations, even 
those enacted by the central government. As such there may be considerable variation in 
labour regulations and/or their enforcement across different states in India. (Hasan et al, 
2007) In fact Besley and Burgess (2004) identified 16 different states in India as pro-worker, 
pro-employer or neutral based on their labour law amendments over the period 1958-1992.  
As such firms located in different states in India face different and often confused regulatory 
environments due to such entitlement of both central and state governments to legislate on 
labour issues. 
2.2 Collective institutions: Legislations, Trade Unions and Wage-Setting 
While there are as many as 165 labour legislations, including 47 central acts (Debroy, 1997), 
the centrepieces of labour market legislation are the Factories Act of 1948, the Industrial 
Employment (Standing Orders) Act of 1946, the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, and 
the Trade Union Act (TUA) of 1926.  
The Factories Act 1948 is one of the fundamental labour laws and is mandated for all 
factories with the objective to regulate working conditions in factories. It ensures minimum 
standards of safety, health and welfare conditions of factory workers and regulates the 
working hours, leave, holiday, overtime and employment of children, women and young 
people in factories. The equivalent to the Factories Act in the informal sector is the Shops and 
Establishment Act – every state has its own Act, which is enforced by the Municipal 
Corporations and is aimed at regulating the working conditions of workers in the informal 
sector, including shops, local retail stores, corner stores, grocery stores and other commercial 
establishments that do not fall under the Factories Act. 
The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act (IEA) of 1946 and the Industrial Disputes 
Act (IDA) of 1947 form the basis for the regulation of employment security in the formal 
sector in India. The IEA stipulates the rights and obligations of employees and employers 
relating to the classification of employees, shift work, hours of work, entry and exit, 
attendance, stoppage of work, leave and holidays, penalties for misconduct, suspension or 
removal, retirement, grievances and redressal procedures, among others. The rules and 
procedures laid out by the IEA are binding on all industrial establishments employing 100 or 
more workers. In inception the IEA aimed to: (1) regulate job security by laying down the 
classification of employee categories, (2) regulate income security by laying down provisions 
on computation of payments for hours worked and deductions in cases of leave, and (3) 
regulate employment security by stipulating the restrictions on penalties and punitive 
measures leading to terminations and prescribing guidelines on disciplinary procedures in 
cases on misconduct (Government of India, 1946, 1946b). On the other hand, the objective of 
the IDA was to govern the relationship between the workers and the employers and thus 
regulate industrial and labour management relations. The IDA, when it was first passed in 
1947, applied to all establishments employing 50 or more workers in the formal sector. The 
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IDA conferred the power on the state to intervene in labour management issues arbiter giving 
rise to a tripartite dispute settlement framework, where the state assumes the role of an 
arbitrator in lieu of a bargained relationship between the workers and the employers 
(Government of India, 1947). Relating to retrenchment and layoffs, provisions in the original 
IDA allowed employers to retrench workers provided they followed the last hired/first fired 
rule in drawing up the list of workers to be retrenched, gave a month’s notice or pay in lieu of 
notice, aid half a month’s wages per year of service and informed the government. However, 
following an amendment in 1976, now infamous chapter VB was added to the IDA, which 
stipulated that it is mandatory for firms employing more than 300 workers to seek prior 
consent of the state government before any retrenchment or closure of a part of the enterprise. 
Since the government’s position on disputes were not free of political considerations and the 
state itself being a dominant employer in the formal sector, it was hardly a neutral participant 
and hence enterprises could never obtain the permission to retrench or lay off workers. In 
1982, the government further expanded the scope of the law mandated by chapter V.B by 
requiring all firms with 100 or more workers to seek the permission of the relevant state body 
before any retrenchment. While an exception for retrenchment resulting from natural 
disasters and power shortages was in place, the penalty for retrenchment or closure without 
government permission included a fine and a prison sentence for the employer (D’Souza, 
2008). It has been noted by some that such populist amendments added fuel to the already 
burning problem of employment inflexibility since government approval to lay off workers 
was seldom forthcoming (Panagariya, 2007). 
Regulation of trade union activity was carried out by the provisions of the Trade Union Act 
(TUA) of 1926, which laid down the rules and legal framework for the registration and 
operation of trade unions. The act allowed any seven workers to register their trade union to 
take part in the collective bargaining negotiations (Government of India, 1926). During the 
colonial period, the trade union movement became an important platform for the larger 
independence movement in India. In fact the movement remained largely under the influence 
of the Indian National Congress – the political organisation that led the freedom struggle in 
India. At the time of independence in 1947, growing ideological differences in the Indian 
political scenario in general and within the Indian National Congress, in particular, resulted in 
fragmentation of the trade union movement. Moreover, as there was no provision for union 
recognition in the TUA, there was multiplicity of unions with outsiders playing a prominent 
role. In most cases, the outsiders controlling the unions have political motives as well as 
influences and are not really concerned about the genuine interests of the organisation and 
workers- they may not be working for worker interests  and instead pursue their own personal 
and political agenda. By the end of the 1980s, practically every political party in India had its 
trade union wing. In 1989, the government of India, following an exercise by the labour 
ministry to prepare a register of existing trade unions, listed eight major trade union 
federations: Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), All India Trade Union 
Congress (AITUC), Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS), 
Bharatiya Mazdoor Sabha (BMS), Hind Mazdoor Kamgar Party (HMKP), United Trade 
Union Congress (UTUC), United Trade Union Congress Lenin Sarani (UTUCLS) and 
National Labour Organisation (NLO) besides a number of small independent unions (Datta 
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Chaudhuri, 1996). In 1996, India had 58,805 registered unions, the vast majority of which 
were small unions that depended on their affiliates at national labour centres to bargain on 
their behalf (Dutt, 2003). An immediate effect of the existence of a large number of trade 
unions was inter-union rivalry manifesting itself in labour militancy. Datta Chaudhuri (1996) 
points out that 30 per cent of industrial disputes in India, between 1950 and 1975, could be 
attributed to the problems of union recognition and inter-union rivalry. Further, there is no 
government provision in the TUA or the IDA or other legislations for procedures to 
determine the representative union which would normally act as a single bargaining unit. 
With employers under no legal obligation to bargain with unions, this means that there are no 
built-in incentives for either party to engage in collective bargaining (Dutt, 2003).1  
In addition to the above discussed labour legislations, there is a prevalent wage setting system 
in India, whereby the Wage Boards and Pay Commissions generally sets wages in the public 
sector, which in turn sets the benchmark for private sector wages (Dutta, 2007). Wages are 
often set at above market clearing levels despite being a surplus labour in the economy. The 
downward pressure on wages is mitigated by labour market imperfections such as prevalence 
of monoposonistic trade unions and minimum wages guaranteed by law, which particularly 
applies to the public sector, where government employees are largely unionised, assured of 
life time employment and face very little risk of being fired (Dutt, 2003).  
2.3 Labour market issues: rigidities and inflexibilities and empirical implications of the 
institutional context 
The formulation of such complex labour laws and legislation, as discussed in the preceding 
section, was obviously aimed at protecting labour by regulating working conditions, ensuring 
job security, managing industrial relations and encouraging collective bargaining. The 
fundamental idea behind social policy concerning labour and employment in India, 
particularly during the first three decades of planning, was not to treat labour as a mere 
resource for development but rather as a significant partner and beneficiary of social and 
economic development, an orientation, which had its roots in the independence movement 
prior to 1947. In fact several legislations to protect labour were enacted prior to 
independence, which were further strengthened in independent India through comprehensive 
and detailed legislation governing industrial relations, as described above. This point is aptly 
captured in the words of Sharma (2006): “The basic idea behind all these protective measures 
adopted for labour was that the workforce was relatively weaker partner vis-à-vis capital in 
the production process and that in a poor country like India, it was desirable to safeguard 
workers to promote both social justice and an appropriate industrial and productive climate.” 
In recent times, policy analysts, industry associations and mainstream media, both within and 
outside India have argued that India’s archaic labour laws are causing rigidities and 
inflexibility in the labour market and there are increasing calls to deregulation of the labour 
                                                          
1  For a more up to date discussion on industrial disputes initiated by trade unions and other aspects of industrial 
conflict, see Shyam Sundar (2015). 
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market.2 The basic idea behind deregulation is that free market outcomes are efficient and 
pareto optimal. The free play of market forces results in employment of resources at market-
clearing prices, which in turn lead to both efficiency (full employment) and equity (prices are 
equal to marginal product). Intervention by the state results in deviations from full 
employment of all resources. In the case of labour markets, trade unions and protective labour 
legislation are argued to be market-distorting agents, which hinder the free operation of 
market forces to ensure full employment of labour and wages equalling the market clearing 
prices. Interference by collective institutions like labour laws and trade unions in the market 
process increase transaction costs which in turn discourage investment, thereby resulting in 
unemployment, inequality in wages and hence welfare loss. These institutional interventions 
in the name of equity and social justice superimpose terms set above the market-clearing 
prices. Consequently markets do not clear and wages become sticky. These institutions not 
only tamper with the ‘price’ and the essential market signals that enable efficient functioning 
of the market, but also affect the freedom of employers to adjust the quantity of labour 
employed in the production process. Labour laws thus cause inflexibility in entry and exit 
from the labour market (non-adjustment of labour market) resulting in segmentation of the 
labour market.   
Within the labour literature on India, there are concerns that the collective institutions like 
protective labour laws, trade unions, wage setting and labour redundancy (as discussed in the 
preceding section) have created rigidities and inflexibilities in the India labour market (see, 
for example, Fallon and Lucas, 1993; Ghose, 1995; Datta Chaudhari, 1996; Dutta Roy, 2004; 
Besley and Burgess, 2004; Panagriya, 2007; among others).   Rigidities also include rigidities 
in deployment of human resources, in work practices and in wages.  
Of the various rigidities, wage rigidity is often highlighted as a serious hindrance in the non-
adjustment of the labour market even in the face of substantial trade liberalisation and 
industrial de-licensing. This is because wages are often set at above market clearing levels, 
particularly in the formal sector despite the fact that India is a labour surplus country. The 
downward pressure on wages is mitigated by the presence of imperfections in the labour 
market caused by collective institutions like trade unions, wage setting and minimum wages 
guaranteed by law. These conditions apply especially to the public sector, where government 
employees are mostly unionised, assured of lifetime employment with lucrative pension 
schemes, and face very little risk of being fired – as outlined in the preceding section, wages 
are set in the public sector by the Wage Board and Pay Commissions. The powerful trade 
unions in the public sector have a heavy political presence and lobby for above market 
clearing wages in the sector. This in turn sets a benchmark for the private sector of the formal 
segment, where wages are also set above market clearing rates depending on the relative 
power of the unions and relative size of the firms and industries they operate in. While clearly 
there is evidence of wage inflexibility due to the presence of unions and minimum wages law 
in the formal private sector (see, Deshpande et al, 2004, and Sharma, 2006), however 
statutory minimum wages have been largely ineffective in influencing wages in the informal 
                                                          
2  The 1990s have seen some reforms in the labour market although the scope and pace of such reforms have 
been quite slow. We discuss some of these reforms in more details in section 2.5. 
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sector due to weak enforcement, irregular revisions, lack of proper indexation to cost of 
living and absence of trade unions (Dutt, 2003). 
Similarly, another serious rigidity in the labour markets in India, particularly in the formal 
sector, is the virtual impossibility for employers to retrench workers or to adjust the quantity 
of labour employed in the production process. This is attributed to the presence of strict and 
protective hiring/firing laws as well as the presence of trade unions. Industrial disputes 
arising from dismissals, retrenchment or disciplinary actions against individual workers are 
classified as due to “non-economic causes” in contrast to disputes on wages, payments and 
bonuses, which are classified as due to “economic causes”. The percentage of disputes arising 
out of such “non-economic causes” varied from 49 to 63.8 per cent between 1951 and 1975. 
Trade Unions fight bitterly even against the imposition of fines and suspensions, because 
these could go into the building up of a dossier against a worker and eventually be used in a 
tribunal to get the worker dismissed (Datta Chaudhari, 1996). Ramaswamy (1984) points out 
that many union leaders are of the view that there is practically no offence that merits 
dismissal. A part of the reason for this union condonation of misconduct may be in the 
interest of the worker but a far more important reason is fear of rival union propaganda. A 
union, which accepts punishment to a defaulter, is certain to be dubbed a management stooge 
(Ramaswamy, 1984).  
In the preceding section, we have already highlighted the nature and concerns with the IEA 
and the IDA, which are legislations aimed to provide job security to workers. The 
implementation of the provisions of the IDA is the responsibility of the labour departments of 
the Central and State governments. This department decides if a particular dispute merits its 
attention, and if it indeed sees the merit, they set in motion a process of conciliation. In the 
event of failure of such a process, the conciliator is required under Section 12 (4) of the IDA 
to submit a general report outlining the nature of the dispute and a confidential report 
conveying its recommendations regarding adjudication to the government. If both the parties 
to the dispute fail to arrive at an agreement on voluntary arbitration, then the Ministry of 
Labour refers the dispute to the Labour Judiciary for adjudication. Trade Unions and workers 
prefer the adjudication process because they have traditionally perceived that the labour 
ministries and the Labour judiciary, as well as the Appellate Courts will be sympathetic to the 
cause of the workers (Mehta, 1994).  
These legislations, particularly the IDA, which confer an important role to the state in labour-
management relations, have been amended over time (1976 and 1982) to strengthen 
hiring/firing laws as discussed in the previous section, due to pressures from Trade Unions 
who hold the view that with the active involvement of the state and political process, they 
would be on a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis their employers. These amendments 
required firms employing more than 100 workers to seek government permission for lay-offs, 
retrenchment and closures paving the way to strengthen “political intervention” in industrial 
disputes. Needless to say, such permissions were seldom given. According to Fallon and 
Lucas (1991), employment in the formal manufacturing would have been 17.5 per cent higher 
in the absence of job security regulations. 
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There are other rigidities that exist in the Indian labour market. For example, India lacks a 
universal unemployment insurance scheme. As such family and traditional institutions are the 
main providers of social support. This in turn contributes to further rigidities in the labour 
markets, as attempts to lay off workers are strongly opposed (Dutt, 2003).  While employer 
liability legislation requires compensation on termination of employment, only a small 
portion of the working population in the formal sector is effectively covered. In the absence 
of state-sponsored social security and scarcity of “good jobs”, employment security in the 
formal segment is of obvious value. Thus the on-going labour market issue should not be just 
about removing rigidities but also simultaneously ensuring the economic and social security 
of the workers. 
While we have attempted to carry out a modest review and a comprehensive assessment of 
the various labour market rigidities and inflexibilities caused by collective institutions, a 
detailed quantitative analysis of the effects of labour market legislations and labour laws in 
India is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is important to highlight that while some 
labour market reforms have been carried out in the 1990s (which we outline in the following 
section), the opinions on the pace and further need of labour market reforms in India remain 
highly polarised. On one hand, pro-reforms policy analysts like Ghose (1995, 1999), Datta 
Chaudhuri (1996), Besley and Burgess (2004) and Panagariya (2007), among others believe 
that the numerous labour laws in India along with the wage setting system and labour 
redundancy have created rigidities in the labour market resulting in substitution of capital for 
labour, preference of casual labour over regular labour and rise in subcontracting of work to 
smaller enterprises which are outside the purview of labour legislation or where enforcement 
is not possible. There is particular evidence of such trends in various industries (see, for 
example, Goswami, 1990; Sharma, 2006, among others). All these studies suggest that such 
rigidities and inflexibilities in the labour market caused by the collective institutions 
constraint the effective redeployment of labour during the process of adjustment to changes 
in demand and technology, and more importantly, act as a disincentive towards future 
employment creation (Dutt, 2003).  
On the other hand, there are observers like Nagaraj (2002), Dutta (2003) and Ramaswamy 
(2003), among others who offer counterarguments to the above view by highlighting that 
effects of labour regulations in India were not immensely felt either due to poor regulatory 
compliance and spotty enforcement or circumvented thus rendering them ineffective. There is 
some indirect evidence to suggest that the formal private sector has sometimes been 
successful in evading the legal requirements of protective labour legislations and restructure 
their technological and managerial practices (Mathur, 1991). In addition to this, Besley and 
Burgess (2004) point out that firms located in different states in India face different and often 
confused regulatory environments due to the entitlement of both central and state 
governments to legislate on labour issues. 
The little empirical evidence available on labour market rigidities is quite mixed. For 
example, Fallon and Lucas (1993) reports an adverse impact of labour market legislation, 
especially the IDA, on employment growth between 1960 and 1982, while on the other hand, 
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Dutta Roy (2004) found evidence of rigidities in labour adjustment to shocks attributable to 
industry specific characteristics and not due to imposition of job security regulations, for the 
period 1960-1995. Furthermore, Besley and Burgess (2004) investigated whether the 
industrial relations climate in 16 Indian states had any effects on the pattern of manufacturing 
growth in the period 1958-92 and found that states with pro-worker policy environments 
were associated with lower investment, employment, productivity and output in registered 
manufacturing.3 At the end of the day, whether India’s collective institutions of protective 
labour legislation, trade unions, wage setting system and labour redundancy have created 
significant rigidities in labour markets is an empirical issue.  
2.4 Labour market liberalisation 
As far as actual reforms in the labour market are concerned, they have not picked up 
momentum despite the extensive and radical trade and industrial policy reforms in the 1990s. 
While the structural adjustment program initiated in 1991 emphasised bringing about a 
greater flexibility in labour laws, required changes in labour laws were not implemented due 
to the lack of political consensus. A handful of changes have been introduced in recent years. 
For instance, a voluntary retirement scheme (VRS) under the national renewal fund (NRF) 
was set up by the government in the first half of the 1990s as part of its attempt to restructure 
unprofitable public sector enterprises. This step signalled the government’s approval of 
similar initiatives in the private sector thus triggering sizable retrenchment and readjustment 
in the private sector, especially in older industries and locations (Nagaraj, 2002; Dutt, 2003). 
Further, labour markets have also been able to achieve some flexibility with respect to wages 
in the 1990s, as evident from the fact that while real wages of workers (blue-collar workers) 
during this period stagnated, the emoluments of managerial and supervisory staff increased 
significantly, particularly in the second half of the 1990s (Sharma, 2006).  
Apart from the above reforms in the labour markets, there is a continuous decline in union 
power starting in the 1980s. Since the late 1980s, centralised industry or industry-region wide 
collective bargaining has given way to decentralised bargaining and, as such, independent 
trade unionism has become more important. The number of plant/firm/company-based 
independent and unaffiliated trade unions has increased, thus causing a fall in the power of 
centralised affiliated unions, particularly in the private formal sector (Bhattacherjee, 1999). In 
fact all standard indicators of union strength show a secular decline, starting in the 1980s and 
accelerating in the 1990s. First, there is no evidence of deterioration in industrial relations as 
captured by the absence of a strong trend in man-days lost due to industrial disputes as 
proportion of man-days worked over the whole of the 1980s. Second, union density declined 
from 45 per cent in the late 1970s to about 30 per cent in the late 1980s, which further 
                                                          
3  It is important to note that Bhattachajea (2006, 2009) point out that the Besley and Burgess Methodology, 
which exploits variation in state level amendments to the IDA, is flawed.  As such, studies that have drawn 
upon their methodology are automatically flawed. He also points out that the literature in this genre suffers 
from various other methodological shortcomings, particularly their inadequate tests for robustness. 
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declined in the 1990s. Third, proportion of man-days lost due to strike started to fall in the 
1980s and the decline accelerated sharply in the 1990s. (Nagaraj, 1994; Dutt, 2003)4 
Further, it is argued that the dominance of a conservative view on industrial relations after the 
unprecedented market based reforms targeting the product markets in 1991, has apparently 
led the following governments post 1991 to overlook its legally mandated role in industrial 
disputes. Apparently, even verbal support for labour has declined in the 1990s as the formal 
private sector workers steadily lost their significance in the political arithmetic (Nagaraj, 
2002). Furthermore several states have relaxed the provision of enforcement of labour laws 
leading to flexible practices at the ground level. For example, in Uttar Pradesh, the labour 
inspectors cannot carry out inspections without the prior consent of an officer of the rank of 
labour commissioner or district magistrate. Similarly, the states of Rajasthan and Andhra 
Pradesh have also reduced the scope of labour inspection and have exempted several 
establishments from the purview of labour inspection (Sharma, 2006).  
Furthermore, Dutta (2007) points out that reforms aimed at increasing some flexibility with 
respect to laying off employees, outsourcing and sub-contracting were introduced only in 
2002. Besides this, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
government under the leadership of Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee attempted to initiate an 
amendment to the IDA in 2002 by raising the limit beyond which the firm must obtain 
approval from the state to retrench and lay-off workers from 100 to 1000 with a provision that 
workers be paid as much as 45 days severance salary for each year served. However, due to 
immense political opposition, the limit on the firms to be freed of the IDA provision was later 
revised to 300 (Panagariya, 2007). 
The above discussion clearly shows that despite all the concerns about rigidities and 
inflexibility in the Indian labour market due to collective institutions of protective labour 
laws, trade unions and wage setting, there have been some reforms resulting in a slight 
decline in rigidities and inflexibilities in the labour market, particularly in the 1990s in India, 
even though many would consider this far too little. In terms of the labour market indicators 
reported in the latest (2011-12) Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) published by the 
World Economic Forum, India ranks 58 in flexibility of wage determination5 in 2010-11, 
                                                          
4  For more up to date discussion on industrial disputes and conflicts in the recent times and their effects, see 
Shyam Sundar (2015). 
5  The flexibility of wage determination measures how are wages set in a country? In a scale of 1 (worst) to 7 
(best), where 1 indicates that the wages are set by a centralised bargaining process and 7 represents freedom 
of individual companies to set their own wages, India scores a weighted average of 5.2 compared to the 
average score of 4.9 for 142 countries in 2010-11. See GCR 2011-12 (WEF, 2011) for more details. 
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ranks 81 in the rigidity of employment index6 in 2009 and ranks 66 in hiring and firing 
practices7 in 2010-11 out of 142 countries. 
Economic reform programs in India have tended to give overwhelming importance to 
restoring macroeconomic stability, removing trade barriers and industrial de-licensing, where 
the basic assumption behind such a strategy is that with price stability and competition (both 
foreign and domestic), the supply side of the domestic economy will automatically adjust to 
the norms of efficient industrial progress. But the assessment in this section suggests that a 
further direct and bolder attempts at institutional reforms, particularly the strict and protective 
labour laws, should complement the product market liberalisation efforts in order for the 
labour market to adjust and reap the benefits of liberalisation.  
However the literature invoked above does not adequately appreciate the point that apart 
from weak measures taken by the executive government the judicial interpretation of labour 
laws by the Supreme Court has also acted to produce a relatively more flexible labour market. 
These changes in the interpretation of law are quite extensive (Singh 2015, Bhattacharjea 
2006), but particularly important note needs to be taken of a ruling by the Supreme Court in 
2001 in the case of Steel Authority of India v. National Union Water-Front Workers8. This 
judgment has enabled Indian firms to employ ‘contract’ workers widely, where the term 
‘contract’ worker refers to labour hired by firms through the offices of a labour contractor, 
often employing them in jobs where they work alongside permanent workers but can be fired 
more easily than regular workers. It is thus important to look closely at the law covering 
‘contract’ labour and the interpretation of the law by the Indian Supreme Court.  
3. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970  
The legislation relating to contract workers is the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) 
Act, 1970 (hereafter, CLA). As the title suggests, the Act seeks to both regulate as well as 
abolish contract labour.  However before we discuss the abolition clauses, it is important to 
outline the contents and implications of the law pertaining to the regulation of contract 
labour. The Act9  is applicable to establishments employing a minimum of 20 contract 
workers. Under Section 7 of the Act, the principal employer has to obtain a certificate of 
registration from the authorities. To obtain such registration, the employer (under the rules 
stemming from the Act) is required to declare the number of workers directly employed, the 
                                                          
6  The rigidity of employment index, measured in a scale of 0-100, where 100 is worst, is the average of three 
sub-indices: difficulty of hiring, rigidity of hours, and difficulty of firing- all three sub-indices have several 
components and all take values between 0 and 100, with higher values indicating more ridgid regulation. For 
India, the rigidity of employment index takes a value of 30 in 2009. See GCR 2011-12 (WEF, 2011) for more 
details. 
7  The hiring and firing practices characterises the hiring and firing of workers in a country. In a scale of 1 
(worst) to 7 (best), where 1 indicates that hiring/firing are impeded by regulations and 7 represents that 
hiring/firing are flexibly determined by individual employers, India scores a weighted average of 4 compared 
to the average score of 3.9 for 142 countries in 2010-11. See GCR 2011-12 (WEF, 2011) for more details. 
 
8  AIR 2001 SC 3527 
9 It is to be noted that the Act has undergone recent changes in the form of amendments and judicial 
interpretations. There is also considerable interest on the part of the new central government under Narendra 
Modi to amend the Act in terms of its scope as well as its content. 
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nature of the work in which contract workers are to be employed, and the actual number of 
contract workers to be employed. Further under Section 12 of the Act the contractors who 
supply contract labour need to obtain licenses. Under the rules to obtain such licenses there is 
a requirement for the disclosure of details such as nature of work for which the contract 
workers are to be employed , duration and the maximum number of such contract workers. 
The license may contain some specifications on hours of work, fixation of wages, and 
amenities. Under Section 8 of the Act, both the registration certificate and/or the license can 
be suspended or evoked if there has been misinformation or non-compliance with conditions 
under which the registration or license was recorded. The Act also governs aspects of wages 
paid to contract workers. In general, wages paid to contract workers must not be lower than 
the prescribed minimum wage; and, while the responsibility of payment of wages is placed 
on the contractor, if the contractor falls short, the liability is placed on the principal employer 
(Section 21(4)) to make up for the payment due. The central (as well at least some state level 
rules) require parity with wages and conditions of work (hours, holidays etc.) that govern 
directly employed workers, if they are both doing the same work. The Act makes provisions 
for labour inspectors to examine relevant records as well as to speak with contract workers 
and initiate prosecution for contravention of the provisions of the Act.  
While what has been described so far is more in terms of regulation of contract labour, the 
law as initially conceived was to prevent the use of contract labour and abolish it wherever it 
was possible with the Indian Supreme Court understanding the intent of the law along these 
lines as evident from its ruling on the case Gammon India Ltd. v Union of India (1974) 1 
SCC 596, 601. Under Section 10 of the Act, the government has the power to prohibit the use 
of contract labour keeping in mind factors like whether the contract workers are being used 
for perennial jobs, regular workers are doing the same job, whether the work is incidental or 
necessary for the industry etc. Over the years, central governments and state governments 
have indeed issued notifications prohibiting the employment of contract workers. However 
the issue of what happens to workers after the abolition of contract work in an establishment 
often ended up being judicially determined. This precedence of judicial clarification allowed 
establishments to widely hire contract labour for all kinds of jobs and is probably the law that 
has enabled wide usage of contract labour. The initial judicial interpretation (as in Air India 
Statutory Corporation v. United Labour Union (1997) (9) SCC 377) stated that abolition of 
contract labour required the erstwhile principal employer to employ the workers in regular 
jobs. However, the famous Steel Authority judgment (Steel Authority of India v. National 
Union Water Front Workers AIR 2001 SC 3527) stated quite categorically that there was no 
obligation on the employer to employ contract labour that may have been abolished by the 
government. Among the reasons provided for this stance, the one that is often quoted is “the 
contract labour is not rendered unemployed as is generally assumed but continues in the 
employment of the contractor as the notification does not severe the relationship of master 
and servant between contractor and contract labour.” This reasoning is at odds with the fact 
that the ‘notification’ made under Section 10 (2) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and 
Abolition) Act is presumably notified because the appropriate government has information 
that the activity for which contract labour has been hired through a contractor is either 
necessary for the industry, perennial in nature, is/can be performed by regular workmen or 
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work sufficient to employ full time workers. If this is indeed the case then there is a clear and 
direct link with employer, but the court makes it clear that whether the relationship is real or 
sham is an independent issue to be litigated as an industrial dispute separately. The courts 
have also something to say on whether the contract labour agreement is “sham, nominal and a 
mere camouflage” by pointing out that if the contract is for the supply of labour then the 
labour will work under the ‘directions, supervision and control of the principal employer” but 
since the salary is paid by the contractor the “ultimate supervision and control lies with a 
contractor”(International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers 
Union and another (2009) 13 SCC 374). These judgments have made it very easy for 
employers to use contract labour for a variety of jobs, with the government almost never 
taking any action against the use of such labour because even if they were to abolish such 
labour the employers are no longer obliged to absorb them as permanent employees.  
Furthermore as indicated it has become very difficult to show that contract labour has been 
employed under sham contracts.  
The courts have also set the terms regarding wages paid to contract workers. As described 
above, while the Act requires wage parity between regular and contract workers, the Supreme 
court has clarified that while looking at the issue of similar work done by regular and contract 
workers, the following has to be taken in to consideration:  
“Nature of work, duties and responsibilities attached thereto are relevant in comparing and 
evaluating as to whether the workmen employed through contractor perform the same or 
similar kind of work as the workmen directly employed by the principal employer. Degree of 
skill and various dimensions of a given job have to be gone into to reach a conclusion that the 
nature of duties of the staff in two categories are on a par or otherwise. Often the difference 
may be of a degree. It is well settled that nature of work cannot be judged by mere volume of 
work; there may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility.” (Uttar 
Pradesh Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Board v. Uttar Pradesh Vidyut Mazdoor Sangh (2009) 17 
SCC 318.320) 
This conjoined with another case (Hindustan Steelworks Construction Ltd. v. Commissioner 
of Labour and Others, 1996 LLR, 865(SC)) which looked into the liability of the principal 
employer to make up for a shortfall in wages paid to contract workers when they were 
performing the same work as regular workers, where the court again did not place any 
liability on the principal employer suggests that wage parity has not been encouraged by the 
law in practice.  
We summarise the timeline of major judicial cases that has led to changes in the way the 
legislative provisions of the CLA are interpreted in Table 1 below. It is quite clear that the 
judicial interpretation of the legislative provisions of the CLA applied to specific cases in the 
2000s has primarily been in favour of principal employers creating a pro-employer judicial 
stance. Such judicial pronouncements and the regime that such interventions perpetuated 
clearly make employing contract labour easier and cheaper (in terms of wages, other labour 
payments and firing). In fact the use of contract labour by employers can be used as a device 
to circumvent some of the restrictions imposed by other restrictive labour legislations (such 
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as the IDA) and other labour market institutions (like trade unions). It allows establishment’s 
access to a set of workers who can be terminated at will and hence the effect of such a regime 
should be increased labour market flexibility and rapid contractualisation of the workforce – 
a hypothesis that we primarily explore in our main empirical analysis in Section 4. 
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Table 1:  Timeline of judicial interpretation by the Supreme Court of India on the 
legislative provisions of the CLA  
Sl. No. Year Case Verdict Stance 
1 1974 Gammon India Limited 
versus Union if India 
Government has the power to prohibit the use 
of contract labour 
Pro-worker 
2 1997 Air India Statutory 
Corporation versus 
United Labour Union  
Abolition of contract labour requires the 
erstwhile principal employer to employ the 
workers in regular jobs 
Pro-worker 
3 2001 Steel Authority of India 
versus National Union 
Water Front Workers 
There is no obligation on the principal 
employer to employ contract labour in regular 
work if the government abolishes the 
employment of contract labour 
Pro-employer 
4 2009 International Airport 
Authority of India versus 
International Air Cargo 
Union 
If a contract between the principal employer 
and the contractor is for supply of labour, then 
the contract workers will work under the 
direction of principal employer, but since the 
salary is paid by the contractor, the ultimate 
supervision, control and responsibility lies 
with the contractor 
Pro-employer 
5 2009 Uttar Pradesh Rajya 
Vidyut Utpadan Board 
versus Uttar Pradesh 
Vidyut Mazdoor Sangh 
While the CLA requires wage parity between 
regular and contract workers for similar kind 
of work, the principal employer can take 
various factors in to consideration such as 
skill, reliability and responsibility of workers 
in deciding whether similar work done by the 
two categories of workers can be considered 
to be at par or otherwise for payment purposes 
Pro-employer 
6 1996 Hindustan Steelworks 
Construction Limited 
versus Commissioner of 
Labour 
Principal employer is not liable to make up for 
a shortfall in wages paid to contract workers 
performing same work as regular workers 
Pro-employer 
Source: Based on authors’ review of judicial cases related to the CLA 
The empirical studies examining effects of labour market institutions on labour market 
outcomes and manufacturing performance have focused almost exclusively on the Industrial 
Disputes Act (IDA), 1947 despite the existence of several labour laws. In order to examine 
the effects of the IDA on industrial performance, the existing empirical literature uses two 
distinct approaches. The first is ‘before and after’ methodology (see, for example, Fallon and 
Lucas, 1993), which examines the impact of the 1976 and 1982 amendment of the IDA on 
industrial performance. The second exploits state level amendments of the IDA to investigate 
the effect of the IDA on industrial performance (see, for example, Besley and Burgess, 2004). 
More recent studies draw upon the Besley and Burgess methodology (i.e. the second 
approach) – see, for example, Sanyal and Menon, 2005; Ahsan and Pages, 2006, 2007, 2009, 
Hasan et al, 2007; Aghion et al, 2008, among others. The unanimous verdict of these studies 
is that pro-worker legislation caused rigidities and inflexibilities in the Indian labour market 
thus impairing industrial performance. In contrast, Fagernäs (2010) fails to find any clear 
relationship between pro-worker court awards as well as amendments to the IDA and formal 
employment in both industrial and service sectors. Goldar and Aggarwal (2012) investigate if 
labour market rigidities and increasing import competition have led to increased 
informalisation of industrial labour. Their study shows that labour market reforms tend to 
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increase the creation of regular jobs; the other result of their study being that import 
competition tends to raise casual employment among workers with education above the 
primary level. The EXIM Bank research brief compares labour laws of India with select 
countries and concludes that India needs to make the labour-related administrative 
regulations investor friendly to progress in industrial development. In this context it is very 
important to note that the impact of labour laws on manufacturing performance (output and 
employment) have almost entirely focused on the IDA at the cost of several other laws which 
have since then assumed importance – one key law being the CLA10, which therefore forms 
the core of our analysis. In the following section, we therefore undertake an exploratory 
assessment of the implications of the recent judicial interpretation of the CLA by exploiting 
data on contract labour engagement in the formal manufacturing sector in India in the 2000s.  
4. Contract workers in organized manufacturing: empirical patterns 
Having reviewed the changes to legislative and judicial interpretations of the Contract Labour 
Act, 1970 [hereafter CLA] in the preceding section, we undertake an empirical exploration of 
the pattern of contract worker usage in Indian formal manufacturing in this section. While the 
existing empirical evidence seems to indicate the presence of large number of ‘contract’ 
workers in the Indian manufacturing sector, this increasing contractualisation of the 
workforce has not been typically discussed as a pointed labour regulation issue. As pointed 
out in the preceding sections, it is widely argued that Indian labour law imposes institutional 
rigidities inhibiting employment expansion. However, the academic literature overlooks the 
recent judicial interpretations to the CLA (see section 3), which has enabled Indian firms to 
employ ‘contract’ workers more widely, often employing them in jobs where they work 
alongside permanent workers. This needs a more detailed examination and we therefore 
explore data on contract labour usage in the formal manufacturing in India. More specifically, 
the aim of this empirical exercise is three fold. First, we seek to understand the evolution in 
the trends and patterns of contract worker usage in the 2000s and whether there is any 
evidence of the effect of changes in judicial interpretations of the CLA on the use of contract 
workers in formal manufacturing. Second, we attempt to bring out the implications of any 
increased use of contract workers due to recent changes in the judicial interpretations of the 
CLA on labour market flexibility in India. Third, the exploratory empirical exercise allows us 
to identify relevant empirical questions and hypotheses arising out of the current trends and 
patterns in contract labour usage in formal manufacturing in India, which we do not explicitly 
attempt to resolve in the current paper, but intend to examine in our future work.  As such, 
our first stage analysis sets the ground for understanding the use of contract labour in the 
Indian economy. 
The data used in the empirical analysis is for the formal manufacturing sector and its various 
sub-groups and has been sourced from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) undertaken 
annually by the Central Statistical Organisation (CSO), Government of India. ASI provides 
reasonably comprehensive and reliable industrial estimates at a disaggregated level for the 
                                                          
10  There has been some recent applied work exploring issues related to contract labour in India– see, for 
example, Chaurey (2015) and Sakpal (2015). 
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formal manufacturing sector in India. It covers the entire factory sector except factories under 
the control of Defence Ministry, Oil storage depots and technical training institutes. 
‘Factories’ are those which are registered as such under the Factories Act, 1948 which relates 
to units which employ 10 or more workers with the aid of power and units  which employ 20 
or more workers without the aid of power. ASI carries out complete enumeration of large 
factories on a census basis, and the remaining on a sample basis, where ‘large units’ are 
defined as factories employing 50 or more workers  with aid of power or 100 or more 
workers without the aid of power. The scope of the current study in terms of period under 
consideration is from 2000-01 to 2011-12. We first undertake the empirical exploration at an 
all India level where we focus on the entire manufacturing sub-groups of the National 
Industrial Classification 1998 (NIC-98) in sub-section 4.1. This is followed by an extension 
of the empirical analysis to a disaggregated level where we undertake the empirical exercise 
at a 2-digit level of NIC-98 in sub-section 4.2. In sub-section 4.3, we investigate the use of 
contract workers in the top 10 states (top in terms of share in aggregate manufacturing gross 
value-added (GVA) in 2011-12), where we also highlight selected characteristics of the top 5 
industries at 3-digit level of NIC-98 (top in terms of highest share in aggregate manufacturing 
GVA of the state) by state.  
4.1 All Manufacturing perspective 
To set the context, we begin by looking at the growth in workers (blue collar production 
workers, not including managerial and other staff) in formal manufacturing. As shown in 
Chart 1 below, we find that growth in workers has undergone several breaks between 1985-
86 and 2011-12. As is clear from the chart, the first half of the 1990s saw very low growth in 
workers, while the second half of the 1990s, in contrast, saw a drastic fall in growth (the 
period of jobless growth). However, there was a turnaround in the 2000s and growth in 
workers saw a steady increase until 2006-07. The overall growth remained positive 
throughout most part of the 2000s. This growth in workers in the 2000s motivates us to 
explore how the usage of contract labour fared during this period? The first striking point that 
we observe is that the share of contract workers in total employment during this period 
increased across factories of all sizes, as seen in Chart 1. We also find that the share of 
contract workers in smaller factories (factories with less than 100 workers) rapidly increases 
with the size of the factory, remains more or less constant for medium to big factories 
(factories with over 100 to less than 2000 workers), and then increases rapidly again for very 
large factories (factories with over 2000 workers). Two natural questions arise from these 
observations: (1) why has the share of contract workers in total employment gone up in the 
2000s, and, (2) what explains the variation in the share of contract workers in total 
employment across factories of different sizes? A potential answer to the first question lie in 
the fact that judicial interpretations of the CLA in favour of employers in the 2000s has 
enabled firms to employ contract workers more widely and hence the use of contract workers 
has increased across all factory sizes. But the second question is not out rightly 
straightforward. We find that the share of contract workers in total employment was 
relatively low (between approximately 13 and 18 per cent) in 2000-01 even for factories 
employing up to 4999 workers. However, once the threshold gets over 5000, we find that 
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share of contract workers in total employment shoots over 35 per cent. There can be two 
potential explanations for this. First, factories employing more than 5000 workers are capital-
intensive industries and as such labour employed is relatively less important in the production 
process where repetitive machine based work or operation/repair/maintenance of relatively 
permanent machines can be easily achieved through non-permanent contract workers. 
Second, it is relatively cheaper for factories with over 5000 workers to engage contract 
workers in their production processes. In fact in 2009-10, factories with over 5000 workers 
employed nearly 50 per cent of their workers through contract. 
Chart 1: Contract Workers in All Manufacturing- Overall Perspective 
  
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
Drawing attention to the employment scenario from 2000 to 2012, we find that there has been 
an increase in employment by total persons engaged (which includes managerial staff as well 
as production workers) from 8 million to around 13 million over a decade (see Chart 2), of 
which, the “workers” category forms the largest component in relation to managerial and non 
production workers. Among the “workers” category, the number of contract workers 
increased from 1.3 million in 2000-01 across all manufacturing to around 3.6 million by 
2012. Interestingly, the share of the “workers” category in total persons engaged has 
remained remarkably stable (76.25 per cent in 2000-01, 76.69 per cent in 2006-07, and 77.61 
per cent in 2011-12), but the share of contract workers in total workers engaged continuously 
goes up from 21.31 per cent in 2000-01 to 30.37 per cent in 2006-07 and further to 34.61 per 
cent in 2011-12 (see Chart 3). This indicates that there has been a shift in the preference of 
employers for contract workers over regular workers over the period of our study thus 
providing evidence to our hypothesis that the judicial interpretations of the CLA in the 2000s 
have made it easier to engage contract workers thus adding flexibility to the labour market. In 
addition, we also find an increase in contract workers in all manufacturing over the 2000s 
when we consider it from the factory angle. This is evident from Chart 3 below which shows 
clearly that, since 2000-01, permanent (or directly employed) employees per factory have 
remained more or less around 50 until 2009-10, since when it has declined to 45 in 2011-12; 
whereas, contract workers per factory have gone up from just under 10 in 2000-01 to 19 in 
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2009-10 and then a moderate decline to 17 by 2011-12. This overall fall in permanent 
employees per factory and overall increase in contract workers per factory over the decade 
suggests that bargaining power of labour has continuously eroded during the period in 
consideration once again suggesting increase in labour market flexibility. 
Chart 2: Total Persons, Permanent Workers and Contract Workers- All 
Manufacturing- Selected Time Points 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
Chart 3: Contract Workers in All Manufacturing: 2000-12 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
Another way of observing the contract worker engagement in India’s formal manufacturing is 
by way of comparing the growth rates between the two five- yearly periods 2000-01 to 2005-
06 and 2005-06 to 2011-12. In chart 4 below, we plot the yearly growth rates of total persons 
engaged (and it’s decomposition in to ‘workers’ and ‘managerial & other staff’), which 
shows that there is clear break in 2005-06. It should be noted that annual growth rates in all 
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categories of employment remained positive throughout most of the 2000s (particularly after 
2004-05, which coincides with a period characterised by high economic growth under the 
UPA government). In the same chart, we also present the compounded annual growth rates 
(CAGR) for total workers engaged by two categories – directly employed and contract 
workers, over the two periods i.e. 2000-01 to 2005-06 and 2005-06 to 2011-12. Clearly, the 
growth in contract workers over the two periods remained high at about 10 per cent, while 
growth in directly employed workers was a marginal 0.9 per cent during the first period and a 
moderate 5 per cent during the second period. This lends evidence to the hypothesis that the 
2001 ruling of the Supreme Court in the Steel Authority of India versus National Union 
Water Front Workers in favour of the principal employer led to a massive increase in the use 
of contract workers  post-2001 across all India formal manufacturing suggesting that labour 
markets have become much more flexible contrary to popular perception due to an 
intervention of judicial pronouncements on existing legislative provisions.   
Chart 4: Growth in Total Persons, Total Workers and Contract Workers- All 
Manufacturing, 2000-01 to 2011-12 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
In this section, we attempted to bring out the possible patterns of contract worker engagement 
in the formal manufacturing sector of India. The aggregate analysis clearly provides evidence 
on increasing labour market flexibility in the formal sector of Indian manufacturing that 
coincides with unprecedented judicial interpretations of legislation on use of contract labour 
that is predominantly in favour of principal employers. However, often we find that aggregate 
data needs to be examined at a deeper level of disaggregation in order to understand better the 
various nuances of the issue - the contract labour Act and its implications for flexibility in the 
labour market, which we undertake in the following sub-section. 
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4.2 Manufacturing sector- A disaggregated view 
There are various ways to capture a disaggregated view of manufacturing. For our purposes, 
we are looking at disaggregation of manufacturing in two ways. First, we analyse the 
engagement of contract labour by factor intensity of manufacturing (labour versus capital 
intensive manufacturing11) and by using the use-based classification of manufacturing in to 
consumer, intermediate and capital goods. Second, we bring out patterns in contract labour 
use at 2-digit level of disaggregation of manufacturing industries at NIC-98. The split of 
manufacturing into these divisions have been guided by many considerations. First, existing 
evidence shows that labour intensity has seen a sustained decline in India in the post reforms 
period (Sen and Das, 2014) not only in capital intensive industries but also in labour intensive 
industries. Given this backdrop, it would be interesting to observe the pattern of contact 
labour use in these industries. Second, there is evidence that trade reforms since the early 
1990s have targeted capital and intermediate goods more than consumer goods (Das, 2004 
and Das, 2015) and it would be interesting to see how contract labour has fared in industries 
classified by the use-based sectors. Third, an analysis at the 2-digit level of NIC-98 industries 
will allow us to identify which broad industry groups have seen higher growth in contract 
labour over the period of our study.  
4.2.1 Contract labour in manufacturing by factor intensity and use-based sectors 
Chart 5 below highlights the patterns in use of contract workers by factor intensity and use 
based classification in two panels - the upper panel reflects the intensity of production and the 
panel below reflects on the categories of industries. 
In the upper panel, we find that absorption of contract workers across all manufacturing is 
mostly in capital-intensive (non-labour intensive) segments of formal manufacturing. 
Between 2000-01 and 2011-12, the total number of workers (production workers both 
directly employed as well as contract workers) engaged in all manufacturing by 4.3 million 
from 6.1 million in 2000-01 to 10.4 million in 2011-12. Of this increase in use of workers in 
manufacturing, capital intensive industries had a share of 81.4 per cent (3.5 million out of the 
4.3 million), of which 60 per cent of the increase was due to an increase in the use of contract 
workers (2.1 million contract workers versus 1.4 million directly employed workers in capital 
intensive segment of manufacturing. As regards the growth in workers by categories of 
workers, we find that capital-intensive sectors saw the highest growth in contract workers - 
over 12 per cent in both the sub-periods (2000-01 to 2005-06 and 2005-06 to 2011-12). 
Whereas directly employed workers in capital-intensive sectors saw no growth in the first 
sub-period and a moderate 5.8 per cent in the second sub-period. On the other hand, labour 
intensive sectors saw a moderate growth in directly employed workers over both the sub-
periods – 3 per cent in 2000-01 to 2005-06 and 3.2 per cent in 2005-06 to 2011-12, and a fall 
in growth of contract workers from 5.3 per cent in the period 2000-01 to 2005-06 to 2.3 per 
cent in the period 2005-06 to 2011-12. This pattern of contract labour usage across labour and 
                                                          
11  We follow Sen and Das (2014) in classifying the manufacturing industries by factor intensity – labour 
intensive versus capital intensive manufacturing. 
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capital intensive sectors suggest that labour employed in capital intensive sectors is relatively 
less important in the production process where repetitive machine based work or 
operation/repair/maintenance of relatively permanent machines can be easily achieved 
through non-permanent contract workers. As such, capital intensive segment of 
manufacturing saw a faster growth in contract workers as these workers were simply required 
to manage and operate production floors, which could be possibly achieved by training semi-
skilled or unskilled workers sourced through contactors. On the other hand, the fact that 
labour intensive industries saw a consistent growth in directly employed workers and fall in 
the growth of contract workers implies that such industries require non-transferable industry 
specific skills which cannot be achieved with non-permanent contract workers but by on the 
job training of directly employed workers. To formally test this hypothesis, we will obviously 
need more detailed data on skills and costs of training by industries, which is beyond the 
scope of the current paper. Nevertheless, our investigation of the contract labour use data 
allows us to consider this as a valid hypothesis, which we intend to pursue in our future work. 
In the lower panel of Chart 5, we see that consumer goods segment of manufacturing had the 
highest share of contract workers in total workers engaged in the beginning of our period of 
study i.e. 2000-01. However, following the judicial pronouncement in 2001 enabling easier 
engagement of contract workers and trade reforms targeted on capital and intermediate goods 
sectors, we see a faster growth of contract workers use for both the capital goods and 
intermediate goods sector over the two sub-periods 2000-01 to 2005-06 and 2005-06 to 2011-
12, while the growth in contract workers for the consumer goods sector fell from 8.8 per cent 
in the first sub-period to 6.4 per cent in the second sub-period. Consequently, the share of 
contract workers in total workers engaged was lowest for the consumer goods sector at the 
end of the period i.e. in 2011-12. The possible explanation for this is as follows. The trade 
reforms that targeted the capital and intermediate goods sector resulted in increase in 
competition in these sectors requiring these sectors to adjust their employment of resources. 
Since it became much easier to engage contract workers following the judicial intervention in 
the 2000s, these sectors responded to increased competition by engaging with contract 
workers rather than directly employed workers. Since consumer goods sectors were relatively 
protected, they did not feel the pressure for adjustment and hence their use of contract 
workers was relatively less than the other two sectors. A natural hypothesis that arises out of 
the above observations, which we intend to consider and explore in our future work, is 
whether there is any link between openness, nature of industry and skills and use of contract 
workers? 
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Chart 5: Contract Workers in Organized Manufacturing- Labour Intensive, Capital 
Intensive and Use Based Sectors 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
4.2.2 Contract labour in manufacturing – two-digit perspective  
In this sub-section, we empirically explore the use of contract labour at the two-digit level of 
industrial disaggregation. This enables us to document contract worker engagement at the 
individual industry level.  We provide information on contract workers use for the entire 
formal manufacturing at two-digit NIC-98. From Table 2 below, we observe variations in 
growth of contract workers across industry groups as well as over the sub periods chosen. 
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The growth of contract workers is more visible in the first period compared to the second 
period. The average growth in contract workers in the first sub-period 2000-01 to 2005-06 
across all 23 2-digit industries was 72.91 per cent, which fell to 61.68 per cent in the second 
sub-period 2005-06 to 2011-12, along with a fall in the dispersion.  
Table 2:  Growth in ‘workers employed through contractors’ across various two-digit 
industries of the manufacturing sector 
Sl. No. Industry 
Code 
(NIC-98) 
Description of industries Growth rate of ‘workers 
employed through 
contractors’ 
2000-01 to 
2005-06 
2005-06 to 
2011-12 
1. 15 MANUFACTURE OF FOOD PRODUCTS AND BEVERAGES 31.07% 41.42% 
2. 16 MANUFACTURE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS 5.90% -9.36% 
3. 17 MANUFACTURE OF TEXTILES 35.23% 34.51% 
4. 18 MANUFACTURE OF WEARING APPAREL; DRESSING AND 
DYEING OF FUR 
133.42% 44.31% 
5. 19 TANNING AND DRESSING OF LEATHER; MANUFACTURE 
OF LUGGAGE, HANDBAGS SADDLERY, HARNESS AND 
FOOTWEAR 
30.31% 46.95% 
6. 20 MANUFACTURE OF WOOD AND OF PRODUCTS OF WOOD 
AND CORK,EXCEPT FURNITURE;MANUFACTURE OF 
ARTICLES OF STRAW AND PLATING MATERIALS 
108.67% 35.26% 
7. 21 MANUFACTURE OF PAPER AND PAPER PRODUCTS 21.10% 37.20% 
8. 22 PUBLISHING, PRINTING AND REPRODUCTION OF 
RECORDED MEDIA 
75.76% 113.72% 
9. 23 MANUFACTURE OF COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL 
115.39% 12.85% 
10. 24 MANUFACTURE OF CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL 
PRODUCTS 
47.06% 62.25% 
11. 25 MANUFACTURE OF RUBBER AND PLASTIC PRODUCTS 85.80% 80.91% 
12. 26 MANUFACTURE OF OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL 
PRODUCTS 
70.51% 63.70% 
13. 27 MANUFACTURE OF BASIC METALS 50.72% 79.34% 
14. 28 MANUFACTURE OF FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS, 
EXCEPT MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENTS 
64.24% 69.58% 
15. 29 MANUFACTURE OF MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT N.E.C 87.47% 88.87% 
16. 30 MANUFACTURE OF OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND 
COMPUTING MACHINERY 
-41.66% 120.58% 
17. 31 MANUFACTURE OF ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND 
APPARATUS N.E.C. 
102.35% 82.58% 
18. 32 MANUFACTURE OF RADIO, TELEVISION AND 
COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT AND APPARATUS 
99.67% 73.37% 
19. 33 MANUFACTURE OF MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL 
INSTRUMENTS, WATCHES AND CLOCKS 
117.35% 42.53% 
20. 34 MANUFACTURE OF MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND 
SEMI-TRAILERS 
137.13% 118.44% 
21. 35 MANUFACTURE OF OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 105.24% 80.95% 
22. 36 MANUFACTURE OF FURNITURE; MANUFACTURING 
N.E.C. 
67.43% 70.31% 
23. 37 RECYCLING 126.71% 28.48% 
Average 72.91% 61.68% 
SD 0.45382348 0.32870815 
Median 75.76% 63.70% 
Max 137.13% 120.58% 
Min -41.66% -9.36% 
Source: Author’s computations based on ASI data 
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Chart 6 presents the share of 2-digits industries in contract labour usage over time. A 
detailed examination of the sub groups of formal manufacturing at the two-digit classification 
shows those industries such as food products (15-16), basic metals (27-28), other non-
metallic products (26) and transport equipment (34-35) absorbs almost 65 percent of contract 
workers in formal manufacturing.  The question that arises from this observation is why do 
certain kinds of industry groups attract more contract workers than others? A potential 
explanation to this is that the nature of industry specific skills dictates whether to use contract 
labour or not. Industries that require more specialised skills will have less flexibility to 
engage with contract labour. On the other hand, industries that depend on workers that do 
repetitive floor based work, which does not require specialist skills, or technical knowledge 
can easily engage with contract worker. This is a hypothesis that we would like to consider 
and investigate in our future work.  
Chart 6: Contract Workers in Two Digit NIC Subgroups- Different Time Points  
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
Finally, we also look at the proportion of permanent and contract workers per factory for each 
of 2-digit industry groups in the formal manufacturing. Chart 7 below lists this for all the 
two-digit industry groups for the year 2011-12. In order to assess the contract worker 
intensity by industry groups, we highlight the ratio of contract workers to directly employed 
works. In the right panel of Chart 7, we compare the permanent and contract workers by 
number in millions and as expected we find wide differences in contract worker engagement. 
Further when we add the line graph depicting the number of factories for these industry 
groups, we do find wide variations. Our first observation is that this varies across industry 
groups implying variation in bargaining power of labour.  Industries with a higher ‘contract 
workers to directly employed workers’ ratio should exhibit lower bargaining power of labour. 
It would be worthwhile to test this proposition later along with an assessment of what 
explains the variation in use of contract labour across industries. This has perhaps got to do 
with the nature of business activity in these sub groups. 
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Chart 7: Permanent Workers, Contract Labour and Factories –  
Two Digit NIC Sub-Groups 
 
  
Source: Authors’ computations based on ASI data 
In the preceding two sub-sections, we have documented evidence of the engagement of 
contract workers across the spectrum of formal manufacturing in India. We find both at the 
aggregate level (all manufacturing) and various levels of disaggregation (broad sectors as 
well as individual industry sub groups) a significant presence of contract workers. This 
becomes even more discerning when we compare with the directly employed workers - also 
called permanent workers. This analysis presents evidence to support our hypothesis that the 
judicial interpretation of the legislative provisions of the CLA, starting in 2001 has paved the 
way for firms and establishments to hire contract labour with ease thus increasing labour 
market flexibility. It has been widely argued that Indian labour law imposes institutional 
rigidities inhibiting employment expansion, but our analysis presents new evidence on labour 
market flexibility in India achieved through increasing employment of contract labour, where 
contract workers work alongside permanent workers resulting in contractualisation of the 
workforce. 
4.3 Manufacturing – A state level analysis 
When it comes to legislative authority over labour issues in India, both the Central 
government as well as the individual state governments exercise legislative powers so that the 
latter have the power to amend central legislations or to introduce subsidiary legislations. 
Thus a state perspective on engagement of contract workers in formal manufacturing assumes 
utmost importance. As is evident at the all India level, that there is widespread engagement of 
contract workers, it becomes important to check how well does this hypothesis fit in at the 
state level. As indicated earlier in the paper, we consider the top 10 states of India (top in 
terms of share in aggregate manufacturing gross value-added (GVA) in 2011-12) and at the 
state level our focus is on three digit manufacturing to get a deeper understanding of contract 
worker use at the state level. 
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As a first step, we identify the states with the maximum number of contract workers and in 
proportion to directly employed workers. Chart 8 below shows the number of contract 
workers in the left panel and the share of contract workers in total workers engaged in the 
right panel. In both panels, we present the statistics for the first and last year of our study i.e. 
2000-01 and 2011-12.  It is clearly evident that the engagement with contract workers has 
increased across all states both in terms of absolute numbers and in proportion to permanent 
workers. This clearly provides evidence in support of our hypothesis about increased 
flexibility in the labour market and contractualisation of the workforce following judicial 
pronouncements on the CLA in favour of principal employers and verifies that this is not 
only true at an aggregate all India level but also holds at the state level. Each of the major 
states in our analysis has seen a rise in the use of contract workers throughout the 2000s as 
seen in Chart 8, both in terms of absolute numbers as well as in terms of proportion to total 
workers engaged over the period 2000-01 to 2011-12. This is true irrespective of the 
legislative stance of the states as defined by Besley and Burgess (2004): pro-worker states 
like Maharastra and Gujarat and neutral states like Haryana and Punjab saw considerable 
increase in the use of contract workers between 2000-01 and 2011-12 just as pro-employer 
states like Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.  
Further, we find that at an all India level, across all manufacturing sub-groups, the increase in 
contract workers has been from 1.25 million in 2000-01 to 3.61 million in 2011-12. In Chart 
9, we highlight the contribution of each state in this increase in contract worker engagement 
between 2000-01 and 2011-12. As is evident, Maharashtra followed by Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, 
Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh are the top 5 to have contributed the most in the increase 
in contract workers over the 2000s. Interestingly, Maharashtra and Gujarat are categorised as 
pro-worker states by Besley and Burgess (2004), while Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh are 
categorised as pro-employer states. Besley and Burgess consider Uttar Pradesh as a neutral 
state in that they have not amended state labour legislation either in favour of workers or in 
favour of employers in the 1960s through the 1990s. This further lends support to our 
hypothesis that the pro-employer verdicts of the Supreme Court of India in the 2000s has 
resulted in labour market flexibility and contractualistaion of the workforce across all states 
in India. 
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Chart 8: Contract Workers and Indian States - 2000-01 and 2011-12 
  
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
Chart 9: Share of states in increase in contract worker use between 2000-01 and 2011-12 
 
Source: Authors’ computation based on ASI data 
Next we discern the type of industry sub-groups that contribute to the employment of contract 
workers in the respective states. We assess the use of contract workers in the top 5 industry 
sub-groups within each state in terms of their share in aggregate gross value added (GVA) of 
the states manufacturing GVA. Table 2 below presents the number of contract workers 
employed in 2011-12, the growth of contract labour employment over 2000-01 to 2011-12  
and contract workers as a proportion of directly employed workers in 2011-12 for the top 5 
industry sub-groups (at NIC-2004) for each state considered in our analysis. A close look at 
the table shows that in 6 out of the 10 states, all the top 5 industry sub-groups in terms of 
share in the states’ aggregate manufacturing GVA in 2011-12 are capital-intensive 
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industries.12 Industry sub-group 153 (Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch 
products, and prepared animal feeds) in Andhra Pradesh and Haryana, industry sub-groups 
181 (Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel) and 154 (Manufacture of other food 
products) in Karnataka and industry sub-group 160 (Manufacture of tobacco products) in 
Uttar Pradesh are the only labour-intensive industries that feature among the 50 3-digit 
industries listed in Table 3. While this does not confirm the importance of increase in 
contract labour use in capital-intensive industries by state as the choice of our industries in 
Table 3 is not in terms of proportion of contract workers in total workers engaged but in 
terms of share of industries in aggregate state manufacturing GVA, it still shows the pattern 
of contract labour use in the capital-intensive industries. The first observation is that the use 
of contract labour has grown over the period 2000-01 to 2011-12 for almost all the capital-
intensive industries across each state (except for industry sub-groups 171 (Spinning, weaving 
and finishing of textiles) in Gujarat, and 341 (Manufacture of motor vehicles) in Haryana). 
The second observation is that the there is considerable variation in the growth of contract 
labour engagement and the proportion of contract workers to directly employed workers 
between industries within a state as well as across states for the same industry sub-group. 
This throws out several questions. What explains the variation in contract labour use between 
industries within states? What explains the variation in contract labour engagement across 
states for the same industry sub-groups? Is it industry specific internal factors like skill 
requirements and nature of production or is it external factors like effects of legislation and 
economic geography factors. To examine these hypotheses, we will need to undertake our 
analyses at a much more deeper level, which we intend to do in our future work. The current 
paper is aimed to undertake an exploratory analysis to understand the various nuances 
associated with contract labour use in India’s formal manufacturing in the 2000s and whether 
there is any evidence of increased flexibility in the labour market following the judicial 
pronouncements in the 2000s. 
                                                          
12 The split of industry sub-groups in to capital-intensive industries and labour-intensive industries is based on 
Sen and Das (2014). They identify 13 labour-intensive industries at three-digit classification of NIC-98. We  
use an appropriate concordance of the NIC-2004 industries to the NIC-98 industries at the four digit to 
identify which industries in our sample are labour-intensive. 
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Table 3:  Selected characteristics of the five industries with the highest share in the aggregate manufacturing Gross Value Added (GVA) 
of the state 
Rank (in descending 
order) 
NIC 2004 
code 
Description 
Share in 
aggregate 
manufacturing 
GVA of the 
state (2011-12) 
No. of 
workers 
employed 
through 
contractor
s (2011-12) 
Average Annual 
Growth rate in 
workers ETC 
(2001-02 to 
2011-12) 
Contract 
Workers as a 
proportion of 
Directly 
Employed 
workers 
Andhra Pradesh  
1 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 29.31% 36111 16.15% 88.78% 
2 269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 18.50% 42809 12.30% 101.88% 
3 271 Manufacture of Basic Iron & Steel 18.37% 10988 10.91% 50.66% 
4 153 
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch 
products, and prepared animal feeds 
9.84% 41311 8.63% 90.27% 
5 241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 7.75% 8706 10.32% 75.81% 
Gujarat 
1 241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 34.88% 38256 6.14% 105.36% 
2 232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 30.23% 7807 33.73% 472.29% 
3 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 15.88% 39784 4.60% 95.99% 
4 151 
Production, processing and preservation of meat, fish, fruit 
vegetables, oils and fats 
9.93% 10194 3.17% 120.07% 
5 171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles. 8.55% 27088 -1.71% 19.73% 
Haryana 
1 343 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines  
18.21% 51319 18.19% 230.12% 
2 359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c. 16.82% 35561 19.59% 279.37% 
3 341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 13.90% 7996 -7.67% 206.88% 
4 153 
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch 
products, and prepared animal feeds 
9.68% 7821 -5.61% 167.76% 
5 292 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 8.08% 9173 15.32% 94.52% 
Karnataka  
32 
 
Rank (in descending 
order) 
NIC 2004 
code 
Description 
Share in 
aggregate 
manufacturing 
GVA of the 
state (2011-12) 
No. of 
workers 
employed 
through 
contractor
s (2011-12) 
Average Annual 
Growth rate in 
workers ETC 
(2001-02 to 
2011-12) 
Contract 
Workers as a 
proportion of 
Directly 
Employed 
workers 
1 271 Manufacture of Basic Iron & Steel 59.45% 16584 22.13% 183.67% 
2 181 Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel  4.12% 7952 28.47% 3.20% 
3 154 Manufacture of other food products 3.47% 8455 7.86% 28.82% 
4 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 3.29% 36111 16.15% 88.78% 
5 269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c 3.19% 7680 8.64% 53.25% 
Maharashtra  
1 232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 25.20% 3669 6.68% 84.56% 
2 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 19.58% 38739 12.70% 84.44% 
3 291 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 9.54% 21883 15.49% 85.52% 
4 292 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 8.21% 18208 19.92% 69.88% 
5 241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 7.85% 13177 9.06% 64.63% 
Punjab  
1 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 45.13% 2836 11.76% 47.13% 
2 171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles. 12.89% 1818 1.09% 2.71% 
3 292 Manufacture of special purpose machinery 6.08% 6083 15.32% 33.84% 
4 269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c 4.00% 72748 33.22% 2054.45% 
5 359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c 3.07% 1703 20.38% 4.51% 
Rajasthan  
1 343 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines  
23.01% 5656 49.29% 92.03% 
2 269 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products n.e.c 21.68% 43995 12.96% 167.47% 
3 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 10.18% 1823 0.34% 13.94% 
4 155 Manufacture of beverages 6.32% 2646 20.58% 65.35% 
5 171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 5.44% 11354 5.83% 19.06% 
Tamil Nadu  
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Rank (in descending 
order) 
NIC 2004 
code 
Description 
Share in 
aggregate 
manufacturing 
GVA of the 
state (2011-12) 
No. of 
workers 
employed 
through 
contractor
s (2011-12) 
Average Annual 
Growth rate in 
workers ETC 
(2001-02 to 
2011-12) 
Contract 
Workers as a 
proportion of 
Directly 
Employed 
workers 
1 343 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines  
10.72% 44314 27.01% 54.22% 
2 341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 8.14% 6363 12.30% 37.00% 
3 281 
Manufacture of structural metal products, tanks, reservoirs 
and steam generators 
7.82% 29466 8.94% 95.63% 
4 291 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 7.46% 11940 14.56% 33.86% 
5 171 Spinning, weaving and finishing of textiles 6.66% 11323 8.94% 4.98% 
Uttar Pradesh  
1 241 Manufacture of basic chemicals 11.00% 6381 4.42% 83.6% 
2 160 Manufacture of tobacco products 8.27% 6946 6.27% 84.3% 
3 232 Manufacture of refined petroleum products 7.29% 215 31.13% 18.3% 
4 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 6.71% 8132 10.64% 56.2% 
5 
323 
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or 
video recording or reproducing apparatus, and associated 
goods 6.58% 3058 22.3% 71.6% 
Uttarakhand  
1 242 Manufacture of other chemical products 16.57% 24736 46.47% 141.30% 
2 359 Manufacture of transport equipment n.e.c 15.53% 9887 120.88% 153.10% 
3 341 Manufacture of motor vehicles 6.99% 2597 - 44.29% 
4 343 
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and 
their engines 
6.60% 28034 94.27% 275.79% 
5 291 Manufacture of general purpose machinery 6.30% 5277 84.74% 99.80% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ASI data 
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Finally, we look within each state, the industry with the highest contract worker 
concentration (see Table 4). It is important to note that we do find some correlation between 
industries with high value added contribution to state manufacturing GVA and engagement 
with contract worker for some states – for Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Punjab, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu and Uttarakhand, the industry with the highest contract worker concentration 
features in the top 5 industries by share in aggregate state manufacturing GVA. Interesting, 
the industries with highest contract worker concentration for Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra 
and Uttar Pradesh do not even feature in the top 5 industries by share in aggregate state 
manufacturing GVA. In fact Andhra Pradesh is the only state where the highest contract 
worker concentration is for a labour-intensive industry. This analysis clearly supports the 
proposition that capital-intensive industries are the ones that engage with contract workers 
more widely. Andhra Pradesh is the only exception where we see that the labour-intensive 
industry 160 (Manufacture of tobacco products) is the one that has the highest concentration 
of contract workers in the state.  
Table 4: Industries across states with the highest CW concentration in 2011-12  
Sl. 
No. 
State 
Industr
y Code 
Description 
No. of 
contract 
workers 
CWs as a % of aggregate 
CWs in manufacturing 
in the state 
1. 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
160 Manufacture of tobacco products 228720 44.93% 
2. Gujarat 242 
Manufacture of other chemical 
products 
39784 11.11% 
3. Haryana 343 
Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
51319 23.57% 
4. Karnataka 271 
Manufacture of Basic Iron & 
Steel 
16584 11.02% 
5. 
Maharasht
ra 
343 
Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
50707 10.01% 
6. Punjab 269 
Manufacture of non-metallic 
mineral products n.e.c 
72748 54.40% 
7. Rajasthan 269 
Manufacture of non-metallic 
mineral products n.e.c 
43995 34.16% 
8. 
Tamil 
Nadu 
343 
Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
44314 14.57% 
9. 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
289 
Manufacture of other fabricated 
metal products; metal working 
service activities  
33031 13.05% 
10. 
Uttarakha
nd 
343 
Manufacture of parts and 
accessories for motor vehicles 
and their engines 
28034 19.83% 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on ASI data 
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It is also interesting to note in Table 4 that there are two industries – 343 (Manufacture of 
parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines) and 269 (Manufacture of non-
metallic mineral products) – which appear as the industry with the highest concentration of 
contract workers across several states. Industry group 343 is the industry with the highest 
concentration on contract workers in 2011-12 for Haryana, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and 
Uttarakhand, whereas industry group 269 is the industry with most contract workers in 2011-
12 for Punjab and Rajasthan. This implies that the industry sub-group and the nature of work 
and business relations is vital in the use of contract labour, a point that should be examined at 
a more detailed level. 
5. Conclusion and the Challenges Ahead  
This paper undertook an exploratory and investigative exercise to assess the Contract Labour 
(Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 (CLA) and its implications for employment in the 
formal manufacturing sector in India. The paper finds that the CLA in India has undergone 
drastic changes since its inception in 1970. Although legislated with the original intention to 
protect contract workers against exploitation and for enhancing their overall welfare, the Act 
has seen major judicial intervention in the 2000s that go against the historical rhetoric of the 
Act. The judicial verdicts on the legislative provisions of the Act, by the Supreme Court of 
India in popular high-profile cases, have been pre-dominantly in favour of employers paving 
the way for flexibility in the labour market and for wider and easier use of contract workers 
in manufacturing. Although there is a modest and growing literature examining the issues in 
the use of contract labour in Indian manufacturing, the above-discussed judicial 
interpretations of the CLA have been primarily been overlooked by the existing empirical 
literature. As such this paper addresses the evolution of the CLA as a pointed labour issue 
and assesses the ramifications of judicial intervention on contract labour use in 
manufacturing. The empirical analysis on the patterns of contract labour engagement by 
industries and states in this paper therefore provides new evidence from India that the judicial 
interpretations of the CLA in the 2000s have resulted in increased flexibility in the labour 
market and has resulted in contractulisation of the labour force. The findings clearly indicate 
that firms use contract workers to circumvent the restrictive labour market institutions 
governing the use of regular workers. 
The findings of the paper bring out several larger issues that need to be addressed in any 
ensuing future research. First, it is important to understand why firms have shifted from the 
use of regular workers to contract workers. Is it due to the institutional rigidities posed by 
restrictive labour market institutions in the use of regular workers or are there other factors, 
like temporary market shocks that require labour adjustment by the firms, or some 
combination of them?. Second, it is quite important to understand, why some firms (or 
industries) use more contract workers relative to others – is this to do with the type/nature of 
work/production processes, or is it do with the skill requirements for the job or skills 
endowments of the different types of labour? Third, there is the issue of investment in skill 
and workers’ productivity, which comes from kind of job security that are largely being 
avoided here. We need to understand if this is conceived as the best business practice, then 
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how is manufacturing going to benefit through a sustained use of contract workers from a 
long term perspective and address issues that are important for manufacturing to grow and 
thereby absorb more people to reap the demographic dividend benefits of young population. 
From the viewpoint of employers the crucial benefit of using contract workers may lie in 
terminating the employment of the worker at will.  But, such workers in turn can/will also 
leave at will. There may be social costs in the fact that such workers may not be sticking 
around to get skilled - so there will be a perceived shortage of workers and in the current 
scenario there is definitely insufficient institutional support around for such workers to 
remain. At the end of the day contract labour is good for relatively unskilled work but not for 
jobs that require some worker investment one may have to think more comprehensively. 
Fourth, the issue of the welfare of contract workers also need to be addressed. While use of 
contract labour may enhance labour market flexibility, one must not forget that these workers 
will be highly vulnerable to negative market shocks, particularly in the absence of social 
security in India. The firing of workers is a crucial risk allocation issue - the current law is 
structured to force the employer to bear the risk and as we have seen to escape this, 
employers have been able to push the risk entirely on to workers given the large scale 
contract labour hiring. It is iniquitous to push the risk on workers entirely. Since society as a 
whole needs to bear this risk collectively - unemployment insurance and other risk sharing 
devices such as worker re-training/apprenticeship programs that can help displaced contract 
workers (in times of negative market shocks) to be re-absorbed in employment are very 
important issues that need to be talked about in relation to labour markets of India. These 
issues necessarily form the basis of our future work. 
The challenges for conducting a study on aspects of labour market reforms and its 
consequences for manufacturing jobs lies in exploring how the various labour laws affect a 
firm's decision making, its operations and its economic performance. In particular, we need to 
know within the confines of contract workers act, how does an increase/decrease in demand, 
introducing a new product, changing technologies, when the firm decides to outsource affect 
key parameters of manufacturing performance. These questions along with the issues outlined 
may be addressed by analysing data from an ongoing survey of manufacturing firms across 
five states, currently being undertaken by ICRIER, as part of a larger World Bank funded 
project ‘Jobs for Development’, of which this preliminary investigative paper forms a part 
and is a one of the first in a series of publications to come out of this project.  
While evidence from secondary sources indicates a significant engagement of contract 
workers in Indian manufacturing, agenda for future research with the help of primary survey 
should be to examine on the economic and institutional outcomes of using contract labour 
alongside permanent labour. It isn’t just about the management of contract labour that we 
care about but how it impacts the firms’ performance parameters.  Does it raise or lower costs 
per unit?  Does it impair consistency?  Does it lower or increase productivity?  How does it 
impact learning on the shop floor and prospects for innovation on the shop-floor, as well as 
timely, low defect delivery. If the turn to contract labour is a compromise pushed by labour 
laws then that needs to come out more directly based on these aspects. This forms the 
challenges ahead. It has often been argued that labour market rigidities stand in the way of 
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enhancing manufacturing employment despite reforms of several crucial rules and regulations 
that stand in the way of manufacturing sector achieving competitive standards as practiced in 
several other Asian economies including China. However, in the name of labour market 
reforms- especially related to decisions of hiring and firing, there seems to be greater 
emphasis on Industrial Disputes Act 1947, especially chapter VB at the cost of several other 
pertinent laws applicable in the Indian context - notably the Contract Labour  (Regulation and 
Abolition) Act, 1970 in examining and understanding the labour reforms and its impact on 
manufacturing.  
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